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Abstract—For fear of retribution, the victim of a crime may
be willing to report the crime only if others victimized by the
same perpetrator also step forward. Common examples include
identifying oneself as the victim of sexual harassment by a person
in a position of authority or accusing an influential politician, an
authoritarian government or ones own employer of corruption.
To handle such situations, legal literature has proposed the
concept of an allegation escrow, a neutral third-party that collects
allegations anonymously, matches allegations against each other,
and de-anonymizes allegers only after de-anonymity thresholds
(in terms of number of allegers), pre-specified by the allegers,
are reached.
An allegation escrow can be realized as a single trusted
third party; however, such a party is exposed to attacks on the
confidentiality of accusations and the anonymity of accusers. To
address this problem, this paper introduces split, anonymizing,
threshold escrows (SATEs). A SATE is a group of parties with
independent interests and motives, acting jointly as an escrow for
collecting allegations from individuals, matching the allegations,
and revealing the allegations when designated thresholds are
reached. By design, SATEs provide a very strong property:
No less than a majority of parties constituting a SATE can
de-anonymize or disclose the content of an allegation without
a sufficient number of matching allegations (even in collusion
with any number of other allegers). Once a sufficient number
of matching allegations exist, all parties can simultaneously
disclose the allegation with a verifiable proof of the allegers’
identities. We describe how SATEs can be constructed using
a novel anonymous authentication protocol and an allegation
thresholding and matching algorithm. We provide formal proofs
of the security, and evaluate a prototype implementation, demon-
strating feasibility in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many cases, the victim or the witness of a crime may be
too afraid to accuse the perpetrator for fear of retribution by the
perpetrator. In other cases, particularly those involving sexual
harassment, the survivor may not report the crime anticipating
negative social consequences or further harassment by the
perpetrator. In such situations, the victim (or the witness) may
find it easier to act against the perpetrator if others also accuse
the perpetrator of similar crimes. Examples of this abound,
a notable example being the recent Me Too movement [1],
which led to many public allegations of sexual abuse in the
US film industry and elsewhere, all triggered by the courage
of an initial few.
An allegation escrow is a system that aids such collective
allegations, by matching allegations against a common perpe-
trator confidentially. Technically, an allegation escrow allows
a victim or witness of a crime to file a confidential allegation,
which is to be released to a designated authority once a pre-
defined number of matching allegations against the same party
have been filed. The identities of the accusers and the accused,
as well as the content of the allegation, remain confidential
until the release condition holds.
Besides helping fearful or embarrassed victims to report
crimes (safe in the knowledge that their accusation will be
revealed only as part of a larger group), allegation escrows help
improve reporting in cases where the victim is uncertain if the
perpetrator’s actions constitute a crime. Escrowed allegations
also enjoy higher credibility since, to all appearances, they
are filed independently of each other (as opposed to public
allegations, where the credibility of subsequent allegations
may be questioned). In technical terms, allegation escrows
have been shown to mitigate the first-mover disadvantage that
perpetrators typically benefit from [2].
A number of allegation escrow services are available now.
For example, Project Callisto [3] is an allegation escrow sys-
tem that has been deployed in 13 universities with over 100k
students, to help report sexual assault on college campuses.
A victim can instruct the system to release the allegation
only when another allegation against the same person exists.
Sexual assault survivors who visit the Callisto website of their
college are 5 times more likely to report the crime than those
who do not, and Callisto has reduced the average time taken
by a student to report an assault from 11 to 4 months [4].
This makes a very strong case for the usefulness of allegation
escrows.
However, existing allegation escrows such as Project Cal-
listo are implemented as a single trusted third-party, similar to
ombuds-offices in many organizations. Although technically
simple and effective in many cases, the use of a single
party may raise concerns about the escrow’s trustworthiness,
impartiality and fallibility to influential perpetrators, thus
driving away potential users. In the case of a university or
corporate escrow, students or employees may be unsure that
an allegation against a high-ranking official would be treated
with integrity. A commercial escrow may raise concerns about
its independence from funding sources and long-term security,
just as a government-run escrow may raise concerns about its
independence from high-ups in law enforcement and the judi-
ciary. In all these cases, users may not trust the escrow enough
to file accusations against people them deem to have the power
to coerce, compromise or influence the escrow. When they do
file accusations, strong perpetrators may actually abuse their
power to prematurely discover escrowed accusations, suppress
and alter the accusations, or even seek retribution against the
victims. Finally, even if a victim trusts an escrow, other victims
of the same perpetrator may not, making it impossible for the
escrow to match their accusations.
This suggests the need for allegation escrows based on
several independent parties, none of which in itself is a single
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point of coercion or attack by strong adversaries. In this paper,
we present the cryptographic design of such escrows. Our
escrows, called SATEs (short for Split, Anonymizing, Thresh-
old Escrows), distribute client secrets—confidential allegations
and identities of the accusers and accused—among several
parties by threshold secret-sharing [5]. These parties, called
τ -escrows, act together and perform multi-party computations
(MPCs) to provide the same functionality as a single-party
allegation escrow, but compromising one or even half of the
τ -escrows provides no information about escrowed allegations,
accusers or the accused. The τ -escrows can span diverse
administrative, political and geographic domains, mitigating
the chances of simultaneous attacks over a majority by the
same adversary.
The first key technical contribution of our work is an
algorithm for matching allegations to each other, even when
each τ -escrow only has shares of the allegation. For this,
we rely on a novel construction of distributed pseudorandom
functions over shared secrets, as well as a novel bucketing
algorithm to connect matching allegations to each other.
A further novelty of our design is that it allows each filer
to decide how many other allegations should match their
allegation before it is revealed. In contrast to other work [6]
that uses the same match threshold for all allegations, this
allows each filer more flexibility according to their level of
comfort, but complicates our matching protocol even further.
Additionally, we designed SATEs to provide a strong ac-
countability property: Every filed allegation can be linked to a
real-world (strong) identity, which is revealed to the concerned
authority once the allegation has found enough matches.
This discourages the filing of fake allegations and deters
probing attacks that all allegation escrows are fundamentally
susceptible to (see §II and §IV-D). Although providing strong
accountability in a single-party escrow is trivial, doing so
in a multi-party escrow like SATE is difficult. Specifically,
this requires a nontrivial authentication protocol for filing
allegations, which ensures that the τ -escrows collectively learn
the identity of the filing user, but no minority set learns the
same identity (else, the adversary can also learn the identity
by compromising the minority set). Our second key technical
contributions is the design of such a protocol. The protocol
again relies on our construction of distributed pseudorandom
functions.
We formally prove the end-to-end security of our SATE
cryptographic design in the universal composability (UC)
framework [7]. Specifically, we present an ideal functional-
ity which, by definition, captures the expected security and
accountability properties of a SATE, and then show that
our cryptographic design realizes this functionality. We also
implement a prototype of the SATE design to understand the
latency and throughput of user-facing operations. We find that
our design is efficient enough for typical use-conditions of
allegation escrows.
To summarize, the contributions of our work are:
- The concept of SATE, a distributed allegation escrow, that
is robust to compromise or coercion of minority subsets
of constituting parties.
- A cryptographic realization of SATEs using secret-
sharing and efficient multi-party computation protocols.
In particular, new protocols for user authentication and
matching allegations.
- A formal security analysis of our cryptographic realiza-
tion.
- A prototype implementation and empirical evidence of
reasonable performance in practice.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In §II, we
describe the properties that SATEs provide, our threat model
and an overview of the various protocols and algorithms that
a SATE uses. §III recaps cryptographic preliminaries, and the
distributed pseudorandom function construction that our other
protocols rely on. §IV is the technical core of the paper that
describes all SATE protocols, including the aforementioned
authentication and matching protocols. §V presents the formal
proof of security of SATEs, including the ideal functionality.
§VI describes our empirical evaluation. §VII discusses related
work and §VIII concludes the paper. An appendix contains
details of our security proof.
II. SATE DESIGN
Basic design and properties. An allegation escrow like SATE
allows users—also called allegers—to file allegations against
accusees. It holds an allegation in escrow until a desired
number of matching allegations against the same accusee have
been filed. After a match is found, all the matching allegations,
along with the identities of the matched allegers and the
accusee, are passed on to a designated authority (e.g., an
arbitrator or a counselor) for further action. This further action
might involve informing the matched allegers and, possibly,
coordinated action against the accusee.
An allegation escrow should, at the least, provide the
following properties.
• Allegation secrecy The escrow should hold each allega-
tion secret until enough matches are found. An allegation
should be released only as part of a group of matching
allegations.
• Alleger anonymity Similar to the previous point, the
escrow should hold each alleger’s identity secret until
enough matches are found.
Additionally, allegation escrows are most useful in asym-
metric situations, where individual allegers are at a disad-
vantage compared to the accusee. Allegation escrows enable
the allegers to build “strength in numbers” without fear of
premature retaliation. However, the very information held by
allegation escrows motivate powerful attacks against them,
since the accusee can gain by learning about allegers before
a large enough group has formed. Thus, allegation escrows
should expect to be a target of coercion attacks. This leads to
the following meta-property, that spans the previous proper-
ties.
• Robustness The escrow should resist coercion and com-
promise attacks. It should continue to provide the prop-
erties above even if some constituent parts fail, are
compromised or willingly cooperate with some accusees.
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A single trusted third-party can implement an allegation
escrow and trivially satisfy provide the allegation secrecy and
alleger anonymity properties, but such a design is fundamen-
tally not robust as any single trusted principal represents a
single point of failure, coercion, and attack. If the accusees
are powerful enough, then they may be able to coerce, via
legal or personal threats, any (however well-meaning) third-
party [8], [9]. A single party is also a point of corruption, in
that the design inhibits allegations against allies of the party.
For instance, allegers may be hesitant to use an organization’s
ombudsperson to complain against somebody closely associ-
ated with the ombuds-office.
To attain robustness, SATEs function fundamentally differ-
ently from existing, single-party escrows. A SATE internally
consists of n independent parties called τ -escrows, that to-
gether form a single virtual entity acting as the allegation
escrow. Information about allegations and the identities of
allegers are cryptographically divided among the τ -escrows,
so that coercing or compromising a minority of them does
not reveal any information about existing allegations or al-
legers. The τ -escrows may span administrative jurisdictions
and geographic boundaries to make simultaneous coercion
very difficult even for a determined, very powerful accusee.
In addition to the above basic properties, our design also
provides the following property.
• Accountability Each allegation is bound to a strong, real-
world identity. Once a match is found, the real identities
of the matched allegers are revealed to the designated
authority.
Although not as fundamental as the earlier properties,
accountability discourages fake and bogus allegations, and
acknowledges that the primary source of authenticity of an
allegation, escrowed or otherwise, is the human backing it.
Threat model and assumptions. A SATE adversary is in-
terested in prematurely learning the identities of one or more
allegers or discovering unrevealed allegations. For instance,
the adversary may be a guilty perpetrator, interested in deter-
mining whether there is any allegation against them. To this
end, an adversary may coerce or compromise some τ -escrows
into revealing information they hold and/or not following
the SATE protocol correctly. By design, SATEs are robust
to such attacks on up to half the τ -escrows simultaneously:
allegation secrecy, alleger anonymity and accountability hold
even if the adversary learns all cryptographic and allegation-
related material possessed by up to half the τ -escrows, and
causes them to behave arbitrarily. Additionally, if the coerced
τ -escrows are malicious but cautious, i.e., they continue to
follow the SATE protocol (say, to avoid detection by other
τ -escrows), then the SATE remains live—it continues to offer
the expected functionality.
We make the standard assumption that adversaries cannot
break cryptography. Technically, adversaries are probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT) algorithms with respect to a chosen
security parameter λ. We assume, as usual, that uncompro-
mised parties (τ -escrows and allegers) keep their long-term
secrets safe. To this end, allegers can discard the private and
symmetric keys used to file an allegation immediately after
filing the allegation, but they must store any unused keys safely
until they are used (see §II-A and §IV).
For alleger anonymity, we assume that allegers do not
reveal any information beyond that explicitly mentioned in
our protocols (described later). For example, they should hide
their IP addresses. For this, they can use standard network
anonymity solutions like Tor [10].
All allegation escrows (not just SATEs) are fundamentally
vulnerable to probing attacks where a guilty perpetrator files
fake probe allegations against itself in the hope of revealing
other genuine allegations before sufficiently many genuine
matching allegations have been filed. While the ultimate
defense against such attacks lies in preventing this kind of
abuse by non-technical means (e.g., by criminalizing probe
allegations), SATEs aid such defenses through the property
of accountability, which ensures that the real-world identities
of all allegers, including fake allegers, are revealed to the
designated authority after a match. To provide accountability,
a SATE allows a user to file an allegation only after they
present evidence of their real-world identity. Further, the SATE
protocol disincentivizes filing of probe allegations with very
high thresholds (that would likely never be reached) by making
a probe useful for discovering only those allegations that
would be revealed at the same time as the probe (see §IV-D).
A. Protocol Overview
Figure 1 shows an overview of the SATE protocol. From the
perspective of the user, the protocol consists of two phases:
(a) user registration and (b) allegation filing. In the backend,
SATE’s τ -escrows user other protocols to match allegations to
each other and to reveal matched allegations.
Registration. SATE uses real-world (strong) identities to
ensure accountability. To incorporate real identities, SATE
uses a registration phase. Prior to registering with SATE, a
user proves their real identity to a certifying authority (CA)
and gets a signature on their public key. The CA may be
the user’s employer or university registering all its employees
and students into the system, or even an independent entity
verifying physical identities like passports.
To register with a SATE, the user authenticates to all τ -
escrows using the CA certificate. The τ -escrows and the user
then run a cryptographic protocol during which the user gets
the SATE’s individual authentication tokens (in particular,
MACs) on a fixed number l of fresh public keys. Each of these
l keys can be used to file a single allegation later. Importantly,
the τ -escrows only learn individual shares of these keys, but
neither the full keys, nor the MACs on them. This prevents the
τ -escrows from learning the identity of a user when the user
files an allegation later, but allows a majority of τ -escrows to
reconstruct the identity (by pooling their shares of the public
key) when an allegation has to be revealed.
For their own benefit, users should register ahead of time,
even when they see no need to file an allegation. This prevents
timing correlation channels. For example, if an accusee is
expecting an allegation due to a recent incident, and colludes
with a τ -escrow, then the act of registration by the potential
alleger may provide a strong hint of pending allegation. Ahead
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Fig. 1. An overview of the SATE protocol. The figure shows a) the user registration phase and b) the allegation filing phase. Numbers/letters indicate the
order in which operations are performed. Thick-continuous and thick-dotted lines indicate one-to-many and many-to-one communication respectively.
of time registration removes this channel of inference and
could be enforced, for instance, by a company asking its
employees to register with an allegation escrow service as soon
as they join the company.1
Allegation filing. When the user wants to file an allegation,
they contact the τ -escrows, providing one of the l public keys
and the MAC on it, which the τ -escrows can verify. The
verification tells each τ -escrow that this user has registered
before, but doesn’t immediately reveal the identity of the
user, since no τ -escrow has seen the full public key or the
MAC on it in cleartext before. After this, the user provides
the allegation’s text along with some meta-data in a specific
cryptographic form, and a reveal threshold—the minimum
number of allegations that must match before this one is
revealed.
Matching, thresholding and revelation. The material pro-
vided with each allegation is fed into a matching and thresh-
olding algorithm that the τ -escrows run in the background
continuously. This algorithm matches allegations to each and
other and as soon as a set A of matching allegations, each
with a reveal threshold less than |A| (the size of A), is found,
all these allegations are revealed to a designated authority for
further action. The revelation contains the real identities of the
allegers and the full texts of their allegations. The designated
authority can then take appropriate action.
We describe the individual protocols for each of these stages
in §IV. Before that, we describe cryptographic building-blocks
that the individual protocols rely on.
1In some settings, it may be possible to use recently proposed blind
certificate authorities [11] to remove this inference channel.
III. DISTRIBUTED CRYPTOGRAPHIC TOOLS
SATE employs distributed (or threshold) cryptography [12]
for authentication and privately matching allegations. Specif-
ically, we rely heavily on (n, f)-threshold cryptography. The
key idea is to distribute a secret among n parties (the n τ -
escrows in our system) such that any subset of more than f
parties can jointly reveal the secret. Any ≥ 2f + 1 parties
together can also perform arbitrary computations (e.g., MAC
generation, private matching) securely in the presence of a
malicious adversary which controls up to f parties.
In this section, we present distributed cryptographic proto-
cols that we use in SATE. We first describe the necessary cryp-
tographic primitives: distributed key generation (DKG) and
multi-party computation (MPC) primitives. We then design
the distributed versions of the signing and private matching
protocols that we use in SATE.
A. Multi-Party Computation (MPC)
An MPC protocol enables a set of parties {P1, P2, . . . , Pn}
to jointly compute a function on their private inputs in a
privacy-preserving manner [13], [14], [15], [16]. More for-
mally, every party Pi holds a secret input value xi, and
P1, . . . , Pn agree on some function f that takes n inputs.
Their goal is to compute and provide y = f(x1, . . . , xn)
to a recipient while making sure that the following two
conditions are satisfied: (i) Correctness: the correct value of
y is computed; (ii) Secrecy: the output y is the only new
information that is released to the recipient.
An (n, f) Shamir secret sharing scheme [5] allows a
dealer to distribute shares of a secret among n parties
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{P1, P2, . . . , Pn} such that any number of shares at or be-
low the threshold f reveal no information about the secret
itself, while an arbitrary subset of shares above the threshold
f allows full reconstruction of the shared secret. Since in
some secret sharing applications the dealer may benefit from
behaving maliciously, parties also require a mechanism to
confirm that each f +1 subset of shares combine to form the
same value. To solve this problem, Chor et al. [17] introduced
verifiability in secret sharing, which led to the concept of
verifiable secret sharing (VSS) [18], [19], [20], [21].
In our construction we use the MPC protocol by Gennaro
et al. [20]. It uses verifiable secret sharing, where Pedersen
commitments [18] on the Shamir shares are provided to all
parties. It works on secrets in a prime-order ring Zq and a
multiplicative group G of order q in which the discrete log
problem is hard. We choose this protocol because threshold
secret sharing allows us to provide availability even when a
minority of nodes fail. Further, since it uses arithmetic circuits,
exponentiation is inexpensive as discussed below.
Notation. In the rest of the paper, we denote the n shares
of a secret value s by JsK = {JsK1, . . . , JsKn}, where JsKi
represents the VSS share of party i.
The secret sharing scheme is additively homomorphic, op-
erations Jx1 + x2K = Jx1K + Jx2K, Jx1 + cK = Jx1K + c, andJcx1K = cJx1K can be computed by each Pi locally using
her shares Jx1Ki, Jx2Ki and any public constant c ∈ Zq . The
computation of JxyK from given JxK, JyK is an interactive
process and requires cooperation from 2f + 1 parties [20].
Note: For systems with n = 2f + 1, such as SATEs in this
work, multiplication requires the cooperation of all parties.
(A minority of) parties that have been compromised by the
adversary may refuse to do so. In this case, to maintain
availability, the remaining majority of parties can expel the
offending parties from the SATE and reshare secrets with a
smaller threshold. This resharing can be done lazily. This does
not affect security, since only corrupted parties are removed
from the SATE.
Given MPC addition and multiplication, we can efficiently
perform some complex operations. In addition, we can use the
nature of commitments in the verifiable secret sharing scheme
to efficiently perform ‘public exponentiations’. For SATE, we
use the following MPC operations:
• COMBINESHARES(JxK) Combine shares of enough
parties to reveal/reconstruct the secret x.
• RANDOMCOINTOSS() Return share of the result of a
fair coin toss to the calling party. The result is chosen
uniformly at random from the field of operation. We use
this for distributed key generation [22], [23].
• PUBLICEXPONENTIATE(g, JxK) Exponentiate a public
value g to a shared value. This can be done efficiently
with interaction, but the result is revealed in clear-text to
all parties, not in a secret-shared form.
• SENDPUBLICEXPONENTIATE(g, JxK,R) Same as
PUBLICEXPONENTIATE, except that the parties don’t
receive the result. Instead it is sent to another designated
receiver R (here, the user of the escrow in SATE).
As described in §III-C, we use the above operations to
construct MPC protocols for computing PRFs and verifiable
PRFs in a distributed fashion.
B. Bilinear Pairings
Let G1,G2,GT be multiplicative, cyclic groups of prime
order q. Let g1, g2 be generators of G1,G2 respectively. A map
e : G1 × G2 → GT is called bilinear if it has the following
properties. (1) Non-degenerate: e(g1, g2) 6= 1. (2) Bilinear:
For all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2, x, y ∈ Z, e(ux, vy) = e(u, v)xy .
(3) Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute
e(u, v) for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2. For ease of exposition, we
assume that the pairing employed is symmetric, i.e., G1 =
G2 = G [24], [25].
C. Distributed Cryptographic Protocols
We need a distributed protocol for computing a verifiable
pseudo-random function (VRF). However, we could not use
distributed VRF (DVRF) schemes in [26], [27], [28] as, in
SATE, the VRF computing parties (the τ -escrows) know the
input only in a secret-shared formed (this will become clear in
§IV). So, we design a DVRF with secret-shared (or distributed)
input messages. Our constructions may be of independent
interest to other distributed security systems.
Distributed-Input DVRF: We use distributed pseudorandom
functions (DPRF) (with distributed input messages) for match-
ing accusations (§IV-D) as well as discovering alleger identi-
ties during allegation revelation (§IV-C). We use distributed
verifiable pseudorandom functions (DVRF) for identity veri-
fication. A verifiable pseudorandom function (VRF) is like a
pseudorandom function (PRF) except that it also provides a
proof of correctness.
VRFs cannot be distinguished from a random function by a
computationally bounded adversary that does not have access
to the proof. For our purposes, we adopt the following formal
definition of a VRF from [29]. Let a : N → N ∪ {∗}
and b : N → N be functions computable in poly(k) time2.
F(·)(·) : {0, 1}a(λ) → {0, 1}b(λ) is a family of VRFs if
there exists a PPT (probabilistic polynomial time computable)
algorithm GEN and deterministic algorithms PROV E and
V ER such that GEN(1λ) outputs a pair of keys (SK,PK);
PROV ESK(x) computes (FSK(x), piSK(x)), where piSK(x)
is a proof of correctness; and V ERPK(x, y, pi) verifies
that y = FSK(x). They satisfy the following proper-
ties: 1) Uniqueness: No values (PK, x, y1, y2, pi1, pi2) sat-
isfy V ERPK(x, y1, pi1) = 1 = V ERPK(x, y2, pi2) when
y1 6= y2, 2) Provability: If (y, pi) = PROV ESK(x), then
V ERPK(x, y, pi) = 1 and, 3) Pseudorandomness: For any
PPT algorithm A = (A1, A2) that does not query its oracle
on x, the following holds
Pr
b = b′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(SK,PK)← GEN(1λ),
(x, st)← APROV E(·)1 (PK),
y0 ← FSK(x), y1 ← {0, 1}b(λ),
b = {0, 1}, b′ = APROV E(·)2 (yb, st)
 ≤ 12+η(λ)
2Except when a takes the value ∗, which means the VRF is defined for
inputs of all length.
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where η(·) is a negligible function.
In SATE, we need to compute VRFs in a multi-party
computation where both the key and the input values (tags)
are available in a secret shared form. Any VRF scheme can be
transformed using general purpose MPC to work with shared
key and shared input tags. However, keeping efficiency and
practicality in mind, we choose a VRF construction by Dodis
and Yampolskiy from [29].
In this construction, if a q-Decisional Bilinear Diffie Hell-
man Inversion (q-DBDHI) assumption holds in a bilinear
group G with generator g, then
FSK(x) = e(g, g)
1/(x+SK) (1)
is a PRF. When coupled with a proof piSK(x) = g1/(x+SK),
it is a VRF. Here, SK is a private key chosen randomly from
Zq , and PK = gSK . To verify whether y = FSK(x), we can
test whether e(gx ·PK, pi) = e(g, g) and whether y = e(g, pi).
Distributed PRF and VRF. A set of 2f + 1 escrows can
efficiently compute h1/(x+SK) if each has a share of x and
SK as shown in Algorithm 1. Here h can be a generator in G
or in GT. To compute a VRF in a distributed setting, we first
compute piSK(x) = h1/(x+SK) using Algorithm 1, then each
individual node can compute FSK(x) = e(g, piSK(x)) locally.
If verifiability is not required, we simply compute FSK(x) =
h1/(x+SK) for h ∈ GT . This is also often more efficient as
we use GT instead of G.
Algorithm 1 Computing g1/(x+SK) in a distributed setting
given JxK, JSKK, where g is a group generator. If g ∈ GT, then
P (SK, x) = FSK(x), if g ∈ G then P (SK, x) = piSK(x).
function P (JSKK, JxK)Jt1K←− JSKK+ JxKJblindK←− RANDOMCOINTOSS()Jt2K←− Jt1K ∗ JblindK
t2 ←− COMBINESHARES(Jt2K)JexpK←− t−12 ∗ JblindK
return PUBLICEXPONENTIATE(g, JexpK)
end function
Algorithm 1 first inverts JxK+JSKK which takes two multi-
plications, and then exponentiates it. The only values available
in clear-text (i.e., not information-theoretically hidden by the
secret sharing) are t2 and the final output. t2 is uniformly
distributed and independent of the input, since it is blinded.
Hence this algorithm does not reveal any information about
the inputs beyond what is revealed by the output.
During user registration (§IV-C), we shall need to ensure
that only the user, and no individual τ -escrow, learns the final
VRF value. In this case, we replace the call to PUBLICEXPO-
NENTIATE in Algorithm 1 with a call to SENDPUBLICEXPO-
NENTIATE.
In our setting, distributed pseudo-random functions
(DPRFs) without the verifiability property, also suffice. This
is because verification is done by the escrows, who have
shares of the secret key. Thus they can verify the PRF by
simply recomputing the PRF and comparing with the claimed
PRF. Candidate PRFs which are readily computable by MPC
protocols are the Naor-Reingold PRF [30], which is based on
the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, or a PRF based on
the Legendre symbol [31] as in [32].
Nevertheless, we use VRFs to avoid the MPC operation
of re-computing the PRF. In addition to being more efficient,
it protects against a fatal DoS attack where the attacker can
trigger an unbounded number of expensive MPC operations.
We ensure in our protocol that each registered real identity can
trigger only a bounded number of MPC operations (§IV-E).
Since real identities are limited in number, such simple, but
fatal, DoS attacks are not possible on our system.
IV. CONSTRUCTION DETAILS
In this section, we describe the cryptographic protocols we
use to implement a secure allegation escrow. Figure 1 provides
an overview of our protocol. Figure 2 summarizes the technical
details of the protocol.
A. Format of an Allegation
An allegation escrow must have some mechanism to de-
termine whether or not two allegations match. To allow this,
along with free-form text describing their allegation, allegers
provide structured meta-data describing the allegation. τ -
escrows deem that two allegations match if their meta-data are
identical. Although simple, this mechanism is quite effective—
it is also used in other escrows like Callisto [33].
Allegation meta-data is a formatted string containing spe-
cific fields. For instance, it could contain: 1) identity of the
accusee and, 2) the type and intensity of a crime. The identity
can be specified either as a name or as a unique identifier,
if available. In an institutional setting for instance, the user
could select from a drop-down list of other employees/students
in that institute. The ‘type and intensity’ of crime is selected
from a drop-down list containing entries like ‘sexual harass-
ment’, ‘sexual assault’, ‘petty theft’, ‘fraud (< $103)’, ‘fraud
(≥ $103, < $106)’, ‘fraud (> $106)’ and ‘racial discrimination
by a person in power’. When multiple descriptions fit the same
allegation, e.g., when it fits more than one category of ‘type of
crime’, allegers can provide more than one meta-data string.3
Along with the meta-data and free-form text, the user also
submits a reveal threshold—the lowest number of matching
allegations that must exist before this one can be revealed.
Unlike other work [33], [34], which only supports a single
matching threshold throughout the system, we allow the user to
pick a threshold to their own satisfaction with each allegation.
B. Initialization
A SATE consists of n independently run τ -escrows, where
n is a small odd number (e.g., between 3 and 11). During
initialization, these τ -escrows are given individual shares of
several keys, which are described in Figure 2. These keys are
later used to register users, file allegations, match allegations
to each other and reveal allegations. All shares use a fixed
3Our protocols are parametric in the format of the meta-data and the test
used to match meta-data of allegations, pairwise. Consequently, they are
compatible with more sophisticated matching algorithms.
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Initialization
1) The τ -escrows execute RANDOMCOINTOSS() to generate secret-shared private keys SKm, SKr for computing
MAC and revealing identity respectively. The public component of SKm is computed using PUBLICEXPONEN-
TIATE(g, JSKmK) and revealed to all τ -escrows. Here g ∈ G is a generator.
2) Shared secret keys SKi for bucket i, are generated using RANDOMCOINTOSS(). The public component is not needed
for this. The keys are generated lazily as and when required by the bucketing algorithm.
Registration
1) The alleger connects to each individual τ -escrow using a secure, authenticated channel. They prove their identity
using ID, a certificate of real identity of the alleger from a CA, to all escrows. The τ -escrows’ identity is established
using a standard PKI.
2) The registration process starts when all τ -escrows confirm receipt of the proof of ID.
3) The alleger generates l new public-private key pairs and secret shares the public parts pk1, . . . , pkl among the
τ -escrows.
4) The τ -escrows use Algorithm 1 to return piSKm(pki) ∀i to the alleger, while only retaining shares of the values,
(pki, SKm, piSKm(pki)), themselves. piSKm(pki) serves as a MAC on pki.
5) They also compute FSKr (pki) for use when revealing allegations.
Allegation filing
1) The alleger connects to each individual escrow using a private and anonymous channel, where the τ -escrows’ identity
is known (and verified), but the allegers’ identity is not.
2) The alleger randomly picks one of its unused keys pki generated during registration and broadcasts
(pki, piSKm(pki), t) to all τ -escrows. t is the reveal threshold. It encrypts and broadcasts the allegation text a, a
free-form field, and secret shares the key among the escrows. It also secret shares a collision-resistant hash of the
meta-data m of the allegation. Each of this is signed with pki, and each τ -escrow ensures that pki has never been
used before.
3) Each τ -escrow locally verifies the MAC piSKm(pki) on pki. If it passes, identity is verified and the τ -escrows take
instructions from the bucketing algorithm described in Algorithm 2 for the next step. Else they send FAIL to the
alleger.
4) Every time the bucketing algorithm adds a set of allegations to a new bucket i, all τ -escrows use Algorithm 1 to
compute the PRF FSKi(m), where SKi is the secret key for the i
th bucket and m is the meta-data of the allegations.
The PRF is revealed in clear-text to all τ -escrows (§III-C). Since all allegations in a set have the same m, we need to
compute FSKi(m) only once. The τ -escrows compute equalities between allegations in a bucket by matching their
FSKi(m). The bucketing algorithm takes these equality relationships to decide which bucket to move the allegations
next.
Allegation reveal
1) When a set of allegations reach the bottom bucket, they need to be revealed.
2) When an allegation is to be revealed, all τ -escrows cooperate to reveal the allegation text a and to compute piSKr (pk),
where pk is the public key used while filing that allegation.
3) They compare piSKr (pk) to all the values they got during step 5 of registration to get the alleger’s real identity
Fig. 2. The SATE protocol. The τ -escrows employ Algorithm 1 to compute piSK and FSK
recombination threshold of f = n/2, so a majority of the
escrows must cooperate to perform operations with these keys,
and any minority can be compromised by an adversary without
violating any of SATE’s properties from §II.
C. User Registration, Allegation Filing and Revelation
Registration. During registration, the user provides a certifi-
cate of real identity from an appropriate certificate authority
(e.g., their employer). This authority is trusted to verify the
identity of the user in the real world. The user also generates
l random one-time public-private key pairs and secret shares
the public parts among the τ -escrows. Each of these l public
keys, denoted pk, can be used to file one allegation later.
The τ -escrows compute a MAC on each of these public
keys pk, using a SATE private key, SKm, which is secret-
shared among the τ -escrows during initialization. The public
component of SKm, called PKm, is publicly known. The
MAC pk is simply the VRF (FSKm(pk), piSKm(pk)). It is
computed in the distributed manner described in §III-C so that
each τ -escrow learns only its share of the public key and its
share of the computed MAC, while the registering individual
learns the full MAC.
The τ -escrows also compute a PRF FSKr (pk) using a
different, previously secret-shared private key SKr. Individual
τ -escrows learn the PRF, but nothing else. Each τ -escrow
stores the association between the user’s real-world identity
and FSKr (pk) in a local map. This association is used when
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revealing allegations later.
At the end of the registration, every τ -escrow knows the
real user, but knows only one share of each of the public keys
pk the user provided and one share of the MAC computed
on it. Consequently, when presented with one of these public
keys and its MAC later, no minority of τ -escrows can link the
key back to a specific registered user.
Allegation filing. A registered alleger files an allegation by
connecting to the τ -escrows over an anonymous channel
such as Tor [10]. During the filing, the alleger submits 1)
a previously registered public key pk, 2) piSKm(pk), the τ -
escrows’ MAC on it, 3) the allegation’s full text encrypted
with a one-time symmetric key that is immediately secret-
shared among the τ -escrows, 4) shares of a (collision resistant)
hash H(m) of the allegation’s meta-data m (§IV-A), 5) a
reveal threshold for the allegation picked by the alleger, and
6) signatures on all the above fields’ shares using the private
key corresponding to pk.
Since no τ -escrow has seen the whole public key pk or the
entire MAC on it before, no τ -escrow can link it back to any
specific user. However, all τ -escrows can verify that the MAC
on the public key is legitimate and, hence, that the public
key comes from a user who has previously registered. This
verification only requires local computation by each τ -escrow
and no MPC, which improves efficiency.
Note that no τ -escrow has enough information to reconstruct
the allegation, its meta-data or the identity of the alleger. In
fact, a majority must cooperate to reconstruct any of these.
This ensures the properties of allegation secrecy and alleger
anonymity (§II), even if up to half of the τ -escrows cooperate
with the adversary.
Allegation revelation. Allegations are matched using a dedi-
cated algorithm by the τ -escrows. The algorithm is described
in §IV-D. Once a majority of τ -escrows determine that a
set A of matching allegations can be revealed, i.e., they all
have thresholds ≤ |A|, the τ -escrows combine their shares to
decode the keys used to encrypt the texts of the allegations
in A. These texts are provided to a designated authority for
further action.
Along with the allegation texts, the τ -escrows also reveal
the real-world identities of the allegers who filed A. To obtain
the identity of an alleger, the τ -escrows compute the PRF
FSKr (pk) (using the algorithm described in §III-C), on the
public key pk the alleger used to file the allegation. Recall
that the τ -escrows also computed this PRF when the alleger
registered and mapped the PRF to the victim’s identity in a
local store. Hence, to discover the user’s identity, they merely
need to look up the PRF in the store. This search is done in
clear-text locally by each individual τ -escrow and is efficient.4
Providing the real-world identities of the matched allegers
to the designated authority allows the authority to reach out
to the allegers and also provides the accountability property
from §II.
Registered public keys must not be used twice. As just
described, after an allegation filed with public key pk has
4Note, that we don’t use the verifiability property of our VRF here.
been matched and revealed, the τ -escrows map pk to the
strong identity of the individual. Consequently, the key pk
should not be used to file a second allegation unless the alleger
wishes to de-anonymize itself to the τ -escrows. To allow users
to file multiple allegations anonymously, a user registers l
different keys during a single registration. This can be repeated
periodically, allowing for l allegation filings for every user
within each period. For instance, every participating individual
may register 10 public keys every year, thus allowing every
user 10 allegation filings every year.
D. Matching and Thresholding
The τ -escrows match allegations to each other and reveal
sets of matching allegations when thresholds are met. The re-
maining protocol (described above) is agnostic to the definition
of a “match”. Here, we describe one efficient protocol for
matching based on syntactic equality of the meta-data hash.
Matching protocol. We describe a simple MPC protocol that
matches two allegations when their meta-data hashes are equal.
We start by noting that, by design, our matching protocol
does not allow any minority set of τ -escrows to match two
allegations on their own. Recall that each τ -escrow receives
only a share of the hash of the meta-data, H(m), of each
allegation. The shares are randomized, so a minority of τ -
escrows cannot check the equality of H(m) and H(m′) using
the shares alone. This property is important, else, an adversary
who corrupts a minority of τ -escrows can probe existing
allegations to discover if an allegation against a specific
individual exists. They can do this without any honest parties
being aware of such probing.
To compare a set of allegations for equality, the τ -escrows
(at least a majority is needed) participate in a multi-party
computation protocol (§III-C) to compute a pseudo-random
function FSK(H(m)) for all allegations in the set. The re-
sulting PRF is revealed in the clear to all τ -escrows, but SK
and H(m) aren’t. SK is a shared secret specially generated
for each set of allegations being compared. The sets are
determined by the thresholding protocol described below.
Since the PRF is bijective when the range of H(·) ∈ Zq ,
H(m) and H(m′) are equal if and only if FSK(H(m)) =
FSK(H(m
′)). Hence, each τ -escrow can locally determine
which allegations match which others. Further, FSK(·) is a
PRF whose secret-key is not used for any other purpose, so
no additional information about m is revealed. Thus all pairs
that match in a set of n allegations can be computed efficiently
in linear-time.
Thresholding. A collection A of matching allegations should
be revealed when every allegation in A has a reveal threshold
no more than the size of A (written |A|). One way to find
such collections would be to run the above matching protocol
on the set of all allegations irrespective of their thresholds.
However, this design is susceptible to a probing attack where
an adversary interested in probing for the existence of a
specific allegation files the same allegation with a very high
threshold. By corrupting just one of the τ -escrows, the adver-
sary could then compare this allegation to all other allegations
in the system, without any risk that its own false allegation
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would ever be revealed (since the allegation has a very high
threshold). To deter such attacks, we control cryptographically
which allegations can be compared to each other. We ensure
that if two allegations can ever be compared by a minority of
escrows, then they will be revealed at the same time, if at all.
That is, two allegations can be compared by a minority only if
they are waiting for the same number of matching allegations.
Now, if the adversary tries to probe with a fake allegation,
the fake allegation and the adversary’s real-world identity is
exactly as likely to be revealed as the alleger’s actual matching
allegation.
To keep track of how many matches each allegation needs,
each τ -escrow independently maintains buckets numbered 0,
1, 2, 3, . . . . The ith bucket contains all allegations that
can be revealed i more allegations match it. Note that one
allegation may be present in more than one bucket. Bucket 0
contains a list of allegations that have been revealed previously.
Algorithm 2 controls which allegation occupies which buckets.
Only allegations within a bucket can be matched to each
other to deter the probing attack explained above. To ensure
this, each bucket i is associated with a secret key SKi, which
is shared among the τ -escrows (SKi is generated lazily when
bucket i is first used). When an allegation is added to bucket i,
the τ -escrows compute FSKi(H(m)) for that allegation using
the MPC protocol described above. Since this computed value
is available for all allegations in a bucket, any two allegations
in a bucket can be matched locally by any τ -escrow. Since,
by design, SKi 6= SKj if i 6= j, H(m) and H(m′) cannot
be compared using FSKi(H(m)) and FSKj (H(m
′)) when
i 6= j. Allegations that are known to match each other, either
directly because they are in the same bucket or indirectly by
transitivity, are said to belong to the same ‘collection’. When
allegations from two different collections are found to match,
the collections coalesce into one. The resulting collection
spans the union of buckets spanned by the parent collections
and contains the union of allegations. Every allegation belongs
to exactly one collection at any given time. To copy all
allegations in a collection into a new bucket, the PRF for only
one allegation’s meta-data needs to be computed, since all
allegations in a collection have identical meta-data.
This algorithm trivially satisfies the property that, once two
allegations are known to be equal each other, they belong
to the same collection and are revealed together (if at all).
This deters the probing attacks described above that motivated
this elaborate mechanism. We also prove that the thresholding
algorithm is ‘correct’:
Theorem 1 (Correctness). Algorithm 2 reveals a collection if
and only if the thresholds of all allegations in it are satisfied.
Proof. Let Max(A) and Min(A) be the maximum and min-
imum buckets occupied by collection A. We begin by proving
that the following three properties hold whenever all five rules
of Algorithm 2 have been applied to saturation (meaning no
further rule applies). (1) every collection spans a contiguous
range of buckets, (2) every collection A spans |A| buckets, i.e.
|A| = Max(A) −Min(A) def= Span(A), (3) every allegation
in a collection A has a threshold ≤ |A|+Min(A) and hence
Algorithm 2 Secure thresholding algorithm. It reveals a set
of allegations if and only if all of their thresholds are satisfied
by that set.
Apply the following rules repeatedly (in any order) till no
further rules apply. Rules 2,3 and 4 only apply to collections
that haven’t been revealed.
1) When an allegation with threshold t is filed, it forms a
singleton collection and is added to bucket t − 1 (since
t − 1 other allegations must match the allegation before
it is revealed).
2) If Min(A) is the smallest bucket occupied by a collection
A and every allegation in A has a threshold < Min(A)+
|A|, A is copied to bucket Min(A)−1. Note that A still
occupies the buckets it used to occupy. Copying merely
adds the collection to a new bucket.
3) When two collections overlap and occupy the same
bucket, and their allegations are found to match (III-C),
the coalesce into one collection.
4) When a collection reaches bucket 0, all of its allegations
are revealed as described in §IV-C.
5) If a collection A is revealed, we make sure it occupies
buckets 1, . . . , |A|, even as A grows. This enables future
matching allegations to be revealed.
can be revealed if Min(A) more matches are available.
The first property can be proved as an invariant that is
trivially maintained by rules 2, 4 and 5 with rule 1 as the
base case. Now, two collections coalesce only if they share a
bucket (and hence their allegations may be compared). Since
the union of contiguous, overlapping segments is contiguous,
rule 3 also maintains the invariant.
To prove the second property, note that in any collection
A, all allegations have a threshold ≤ Max(A) by definition.
If Span(A) < |A|, Max(A) = (Max(A) − Min(A)) +
Min(A) < |A| + Min(A) since Max(A) − Min(A) def=
Span(A). Hence rule 2 can be applied repeatedly until
Span(A) increases to equal |A|. Hence Span(A) ≥ |A|. We
now prove that Span(A) ≤ |A| is an invariant with rule 1
as the base case. While applying Rule 3 to create C out
of A and B, we use induction. |C| spans a union of the
parent’s buckets, hence Span(C) ≤ Span(A) + Span(B) ≤
|A| + |B| = |C| because A and B are disjoint. Hence the
invariant is maintained. Rule 2 would not apply if it causes
the invariant to be broken, as there is at-least one allegation
with threshold Max(A) if A is not yet revealed (which is when
rule 2 applies). The threshold condition for this allegation will
not be met if Span(A) > |A|, as it implies the threshold
t =Max(A)
def
=Min(A)+Span(A) > Min(A)+ |A|. Rules
4 and 5 trivially maintain the invariant.
The third property is explicitly maintained as an invariant by
rule 2 and is trivially satisfied by rules 1 and 5. Rule 3 is appli-
cable in two ways. First, when a new allegation arrives in be-
tween an older collection, the property is not broken. Second,
if two existing collections, A and B, coalesce into C by rule 3,
one is ‘above’ another. Let Min(B) =Max(A), without loss
of generality. Then, Min(C) =Min(A), hence allegations in
A satisfy the property. The drop in Min for allegations in B
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is Min(B) −Min(C) = Max(A) −Min(A) = |A|, which
is compensated by a corresponding increase in size of the
collection by |A|.
We now use these properties to prove correctness. The third
property implies that when a collection A is revealed, the
threshold condition is satisfied for all revealed allegations,
since Min(A) = 0. To prove the other direction, let there be n
allegations such that all their thresholds are ≤ n. Assume for
contradiction that they are not revealed. This means that they
all belong to buckets 1, . . . , n−1. By the pigeonhole principle,
there will be one bucket with multiple allegations which will
start coalescing with rules 2 and 3. If the process stops with
a collection of size k < n, n− k− 1 buckets will be left with
n − k allegations, because property 2 ensures the size of a
collection equals its span. Again, by the pigeonhole principle,
the coalescing process starts. This continues till there is only
one collection with n allegations that spans buckets 0 . . . n−1
and all n allegations get revealed. Hence, a set of n matching
allegations are revealed if and only if all their thresholds are
≤ n.
E. PRF computation cost
The computationally expensive steps in the SATE proto-
col are the VRF/PRF computations that require interaction
between the τ -escrows as well as multiplication and expo-
nentiation over shared secrets. However, the number of PRF
computations scales very well (linearly) with the number of
users as well as the number of allegations filed.
Registering a new user requires two VRF/PRF computations
for every public key pk that the user provides, one to compute
the MAC on the key one to compute FSKr (pk).
Filing an allegation does not, of itself, require any PRF com-
putation. The thresholding protocol, if implemented naively,
requires computing the PRF function, (t − 1) times for an
allegation with threshold t (once for each of the buckets
t − 1, t − 2, . . . , 1). However, this cost can be reduced by
observing that to move a collection into a new bucket, we only
need to compute PRF for one of the allegations, since they all
have identical meta-data. Using this idea, we can prove that,
in an amortized sense, we need to compute the PRF at most
twice for each allegation, independent of its threshold. Finally,
revealing an allegation requires one more PRF computation (to
discover the identity of the alleger). To summarize, on average,
every filed allegation requires 2 PRF computations if it is never
revealed, and 3 PRF computations if it is revealed.
DoS attacks on PRF computation. In general, systems that
use expensive MPC are susceptible to crippling denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks that trigger repeated MPC operations.
However, the previous discussion implies that SATEs are
resistant to such DoS attacks against their PRF computation.
Recall that only real users can register in a SATE. Further,
each user is only allowed to register a fixed number l of
public keys in any issue period and each key can only be
used to file one allegation. So, a registered user can cause at
most (2+3)l = 5l PRF computations in any issue period. For
l = 10 and an issue period of one year, this amounts to at
most 50 PRF computations per year per real user, which is an
extremely low rate for an effective DoS attack.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we formally show that our scheme is secure
in the UC framework [7]. We start by presenting an ideal
functionality, which, by definition captures the security and
privacy properties we expect of our protocol (§II). Then we
prove that our protocol (§IV) realizes this ideal functionality.
A. Ideal world
Figure 3 describes an ideal functionality FSATE , which
models the intended behavior a SATE, in terms of functionality
and security properties. Agents (allegers and τ -escrows) are
modeled as interactive Turing machines communicating with
the ideal functionality FSATE via secure and authenticated
channels, due to which FSATE knows the identities of the
agents. The adversary A is a probabilistic polynomial-time
Turing machine that has additional interfaces to corrupt a
minority of τ -escrows and add-and-corrupt allegers. A has
access to the internal state of corrupted agents and all their
communication is routed through A.
All allegers have certificates of real identity from a trusted
offline authority. For the real protocol, we model anonymous
communication between an alleger and a τ -escrow as an
ideal functionality Fanon, as proposed in [35]. Moreover, we
assume the existence of a broadcast channel for allegers to
reliably communicate with all τ -escrows and we model this
as a bulletin board (such as [36]) with an ideal functionality
FB. Our idealized process FSATE uses Fanon and FB as
subroutines, i.e., our protocol is specified in the (FB,Fanon)-
hybrid model. We omit the handling of session IDs (SIDs)
in FSATE to reduce clutter. Messages are assumed to be
implicitly associated with SIDs.
Discussion. FSATE satisfies the allegation secrecy, alleger
anonymity and accountability properties described in §II, rel-
ative to our threat model. We briefly describe why.
Allegation secrecy and alleger anonymity are ensured be-
cause FSATE reveals information about an allegation only in
the following scenarios: (1) FSATE reveals a user’s identity
then they register into the system. This is harmless since users
register irrespective of whether or not they currently intend to
file an allegation. (2) As the bucketing protocol progresses,
FSATE reveals which allegations match which others: if all
of a set of matching allegations are filed by honest users,
the adversary learns nothing but statistics about how many
allegations match each other. (3) It reveals the threshold of
an allegation when it is filed. (4) Finally it reveals the entire
allegation when its threshold is met and is ready to be revealed.
Because of (2) above, this ideal functionality admits a
somewhat surprising attack: If an adversary files an allegation,
it immediately learns whether other matching allegations exist.
Our actual protocol (§IV) allows an adversary to realize
this attack by compromising any τ -escrow and observing its
thresholding protocol. These attacks are consistent with our
threat model, which allows for probing attacks by adversaries.
Also, as explained in §IV-D, our thresholding protocol is
carefully designed to disincentivize these attacks.
Accountability is ensured since, if a user files an allega-
tion, FSATE reveals their real identity (ID) as soon as their
10
Initialization
1) Initialize empty lists of registered users, allegations
and thresholding buckets.
Registration
1) User with identity ID sends Register to FSATE
2) FSATE sends (Register, ID) to all the n τ -
escrows, where ID is the alleger’s real (strong)
identity.
3) If all τ -escrows send OK back to FSATE , registra-
tion succeeds and FSATE sends OK to the alleger
and all n τ -escrows. FSATE adds user to its list of
registered users.
4) If any τ -escrow sends FAIL instead, registration
fails and FSATE sends FAIL to τ -escrows and user.
Allegation filing
1) Alleger with identity ID sends (File,m, a, t) to
FSATE . m is the meta-data, a is the allegation text
and t is the threshold.
2) If alleger didn’t register previously or has already
filed l allegations, FSATE returns FAIL to every-
body and aborts.
3) Else FSATE sends (File, t,#) to all τ -escrows. #
is a unique identifier that FSATE assigns for this
allegation.
4) FSATE adds (ID,m, a, t,#) to its list of allegations.
5) FSATE now runs the bucketing protocol in Algo-
rithm 2. As this allegation moves across buckets
and matches other allegations, it sends information
about which allegations match which others to all
τ -escrows. But before a set of allegations goes to
a new bucket i, FSATE sends (MoveRequest, i) to
all τ -escrows. They are expected to respond with
OK. If anybody responds with FAIL, the matching
protocol is aborted.
6) If, in the matching protocol, a set of allegations
reaches the bottom bucket, FSATE sends (a, ID,#)
to all τ -escrows for every allegation in the set. s and
ID are the allegation text and strong identity respec-
tively. # is a unique identifier for each allegation
that was filed.
Fig. 3. The ideal functionality for SATEs, FSATE .
threshold is met. Note that we already proved the thresholding
protocol correct in §IV-D, Theorem 1.
B. UC-Security Analysis
Let EXECρ,A,E be the ensemble of the outputs of the
environment E when interacting with the adversary A and
parties running the protocol ρ (over the random coins of all
the involved machines).
Definition 2 (UC-Security). A protocol ρ UC-realizes an ideal
functionality F if for any adversary A there exists a simulator
S such that for any environment E the ensembles EXECρ,A,E
and EXECF,S,E are computationally indistinguishable.
Compute VRF Verify
VRF
Round Complexity 12 + 6n 0
Non-precomputable
exponentiations
4nf + 7n− 3f − 6 0
Precomputable
exponentiations
3nf + 7n+ 5f 1
Multiplications 8nf + 9n− f − 9 1
Bilinear Pairing 2n− 2 1
Randomness (n+ 4f + 5) log q bits 0
Fig. 4. Number of network rounds and breakdown of cryptographic oper-
ations required per τ -escrow for VRF computation and verification by our
implementation. n is the number of τ -escrows and f is the number of shares
required to reconstruct shared secrets. Typically we choose f =
⌊
n+1
2
⌋
.
Multiplications and exponentiations are group operations (of order q). Pre-
computable exponentiations are ones where the base is known beforehand,
and precomputing the exponents reduces the online running time. One ‘round’
of communication may involve each pair of servers exchanging information.
PRF computations have the same complexity as VRF computations, except
the operations are performed on group GT and not G. Registering a key and
filing an allegation, the two expensive parts of the SATE protocol, require 2
VRF/PRF computations each in an amortized sense.
We prove UC-security in the (FB,Fanon)-hybrid model.
Theorem 3 holds for any UC-secure realization of FB and
Fanon.
Theorem 3 (UC-Security). Let RANDOMCOINTOSS() be a
secure DKG protocol, let FJSKK(JxK) be a secure distributed
input DVRF protocol, and let (E,D) be a non-committing
symmetric encryption scheme. Then the SATE protocol UC-
realizes the ideal functionality FSATE defined in Figure 3 in
the(FB,Fanon)-hybrid model.
We provide a proof sketch of Theorem 3 in Appendix A.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of the SATE protocol in two
ways. First, we count the number of cryptographic operations
and the number of rounds of communication used in our
implementation. This is shown in Figure 4 and provides an
abstract overview of the complexity of the implementation.
Second, we implement the protocol and evaluate its per-
formance empirically. We build our prototype in Java using
SCAPI [37] version 2.3 bindings for OpenSSL [38] version 1.1
and a Pairing Based Cryptography library, jPBC [39] version
2.0. We use a MySQL database to store all of a τ -escrow’s
persistent state. We pre-populate the databases with 1 million
allegations from 1 million distinct users. These numbers are
chosen represent an extreme worst-case for a SATE deploy-
ment.
Latency and throughput. We first measure the latency and
throughput of user-SATE interaction in a realistic setting,
where τ -escrows are geographically distributed. We set up
to 9 τ -escrows on Amazon AWS cloud servers, chosen to
maximize geographical extent. In an experiment involving n
τ -escrows, the τ -escrows run on servers in the first n of
Virginia, Frankfurt, Sydney, N. California, Singapore, Sao
Paulo, London, Seoul, and Mumbai. Each τ -escrow runs on a
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M4.large AWS instance. At the time of the experiments, this
provided 2 vCPUs, 8GB of RAM, and ‘moderate’ network
performance. Each server runs up to 60 threads, the maximum
supported on the machines; each thread handles one concurrent
client request. Note that the SATE protocol is embarrassingly
parallel with respect to client requests—cost is dominated by
network latencies and MPC computation, which require no
syncing across client requests; such synchronization is needed
only for database operations. We use up to 60 client replicas,
all hosted on a single c4.4xlarge instance of AWS in ...5 At
the time of our experiments, this provides 16 vCPUs, 30GB
RAM and ‘High’ network performance.
Latency: Figure 5 (top) shows the average latency for
registering a new key as the number of τ -escrows varies, in
two configurations: When the τ -escrows are lightly loaded
(no concurrent requests) and when they are heavily loaded
(60 concurrent clients). There are three notable aspects here.
First, as expected, the latency increases with the number of
τ -escrows (since the MPC becomes more complex). Second,
increasing the number of concurrent clients does not increase
the latency significantly. This suggests that the cost is domi-
nated by the number of τ -escrows and inter-escrow network
latencies. Finally, even though the absolute latency numbers
might look high (of the order of 10s of seconds), they are
acceptable since user interaction with SATEs is relatively
infrequent. In particular, users register new keys once every
few months, so such latencies seem quite practical. The other
interactive operation—filing an allegation—does not require
any MPC and has an even lower latency.
Throughput: Next, we measure the throughput of SATE
in terms of the number of key registrations and allegation
filings it can handle per second. Here, we use 60 concurrent
clients. In the first experiment, each client registers new keys
sequentially. The pink line in Figure 5 (bottom) shows the
average number of key registrations the τ -escrows can handle
per second as a function of the number of τ -escrows. As
expected, this number decreases with the number of τ -escrows,
from 2.5 ops/s for n = 3 to 1 ops/s for n = 9.
In the second experiment, each client repeatedly files al-
legations with thresholds varying between 2 and 20, chosen
from a truncated exponential distribution with mean 5. When a
threshold of t is chosen, t matching allegations are created with
50% probability, and t−1 matching allegations are created the
rest of the time. These, respectively, represent the cases where
the allegation is eventually revealed and the worst-case (for
performance) when the allegation is not actually revealed. The
green line in Figure 5 (bottom) shows the average number of
allegation filings the τ -escrows can handle per second. Again,
this number decreases with the number of τ -escrows and varies
from 3 ops/s for n = 3 to 2 ops/s for n = 9.
We believe that these throughputs are acceptable for SATE,
since user operations are expected to be very infrequent.
Moreover, each τ -escrow can be separately replicated on
several servers to get proportionally higher throughput.
Impact of network latency. We conducted a further experi-
ment to measure the impact of inter-escrow network latency
5We have anonymized the precise location for review.
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network is varied. Values are shown for number of τ -escrows varying from
3 to 9.
on user-perceived latency. To get predictable latencies, we
conduct this experiment on an emulated network using Linux
qdiscs. We run the experiments on a single Amazon AWS
c4.4xlarge instance. The τ -escrow servers and our client
occupy one core each. Every pair of τ -escrow servers is
given an emulated 100 Mbps link and 1 bandwidth×delay
worth of buffer (1 Bandwidth Delay Product of buffer is the
recommended buffer size for full link utilization by TCP and
minimal delay). We vary the latency of the emulated network
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links and plot the latencies of a) registering a key, and b)
processing one allegation completely with no matches. These
require two and one PRF computations, respectively. (Note
that the user perceived latency of allegation filing is different
from that of processing the allegation. Filing does not require
any PRF computation.)
Figure 6 shows the results. As expected, the client latency
increases linearly with the network latencies, and the rate of
increase also increases with the number of τ -escrows.
VII. RELATED WORK
We described prior work on relevant cryptographic prim-
itives in §III. Here, we discuss related work on allegation
escrows and other systems that are similar to SATE.
In a Michigan Law Review article, Ayres and Unkovic [2]
discuss the utility of allegation escrows in encouraging re-
porting of sexual misconduct. Project Callisto [3] is a non-
profit partnership involving several US universities based on
this idea. The project maintains a web site where sexual
assault victims can file timestamped reports, with the option
of automatically forwarding the report to campus authorities
as soon as a second victim files a report accusing the same
person. The anonymity of allegers and accused, as well as
the confidentiality of the allegations, however, rests on the
integrity of the website and its administrators.
Concurrent to our work, Project Callisto has developed a
cryptographic solution to distribute the trust assumptions [33],
[6]. In contrast to our solution which is provably secure,
Callisto’s security analysis is informal. The solution uses
two servers—a key server and a database server, and uses
OPRFs to match allegations, but in a way different from ours.
Callisto’s threat model is weaker than ours. First, in Callisto’s
protocol, the alleger’s identity is revealed to the key server
while filing an allegation. This makes the key server a weak
point of attack: Coercing or compromising just this server
can reveal all alleger identities to the adversary. Further, if
a perpetrator learns that one of their victims filed an escrowed
allegation soon after the crime, it is easy to deduce the
probable content of the allegation. In contrast, in SATE, no τ -
escrow learns the identity of any alleger until enough matches
are found, and coercing up to a minority set of τ -escrows
affords the adversary no information in this regard. Second,
Callisto’s solution provides no defense against probing attacks,
while SATE’s accountability mechanism provides a deterrent
to these attacks. Additionally, Callisto’s cryptographic solution
forces the same match thresholds on all allegations (Callisto’s
current implementation supports only the threshold 2). In
contrast, SATE allows per-allegation thresholds, which allegers
can pick to their own satisfaction.
In recent work, Harnik et al. [34] use a hardware-backed
secure enclave (built on Intel SGX) to isolate a fully au-
tonomous, single-party allegation escrow. Although such an
enclave resists coercion attacks on its administrator, the code
within the enclave may still be vulnerable to hacks and exploits
on its interface. This solution can be combined with ideas from
SATE to obtain a threat model stronger than that of either:
SATE’s τ -escrows can be hosted in SGX enclaves to provide
a second line of defense even when the administrators of a
majority of τ -escrows are coerced by the adversary.
SATE’s functionality shares some attributes with covert
computation [40], [41]. In SATE, allegers wish to perform
computation like matching and thresholding, but only want
the other party to know the result under certain conditions
(i.e, when thresholds of all allegations in a matching set
are satisfied). Otherwise even the intent to compute remains
hidden. Covert multi-party computation protocols perform
computation and reveal the result only if all parties participated
and the result is favorable. Our system differ in significant
ways. First, SATE is not meant to be a general-purpose
solution for covert computation. On the other hand, SATE is
efficient for its specific application, and scales well to a very
large number of participants. Second, in SATE, if the result is
revealed, each participant gets a third-party auditable signature
from the other participants. The signature is on their inputs to
the protocol and on the fact that they participated. On the flip
side, participants in our system need to trust that half of the
escrows are trustworthy.
At a very high-level, DC-nets [42] have a system structure
similar to SATEs in that a small set of cooperating authorities
serve the privacy needs of a large number of users. However,
the specific goals of DC-nets and SATE are very different. DC-
nets are used to provide user anonymity in communication,
while SATEs provide allegation escrows. Technically, DC-nets
solve the dining cryptographers problem to securely compute
the bitwise OR of every authority’s input. Many other schemes
build on the basic idea of DC-nets to efficiently implement
a scalable anonymizing network, even in the presence of
corrupted parties who try to jam the communication [43], [44].
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented SATE, a robust system that implements
an allegation escrow with strong cryptographic security guar-
antees, and showed that it is practical. SATE keeps accusations
and the identities of allegers and accusees confidential until
alleger-specified match-thresholds are reached. The system’s
security and privacy guarantees provably hold as long as a
majority of the escrow parties are uncorrupted. Our empirical
evaluation suggests that SATEs are efficient enough to be used
in practice.
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APPENDIX A
POSTPONED SECURITY ANALYSIS
Definition 4. [45]. An symmetric encryption scheme (E,D)
is non committing if there exist two PPT algorithms (A1,A2)
s.t. (c, k) and (c′, k′) are computationally indistinguishable
when c′ ← A1(1λ), k′ ← A2(c′,M), k ← K and c ←
E(k,M) for all M ∈M where K,M, C denote key, message
and ciphertext spaces respectively
We refer [45] for simple construction.
Proof Sketch for Proof Theorem 3. Our proof strategy con-
sists of the description of a simulator S that handles users
corrupted by the attacker and simulates the real world exe-
cution protocol while interacting with the ideal functionality
FSATE .
The simulator S spawns honest users at adversarial will and
impersonates them until the environment E makes a corruption
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query on one of the users: At this point S hands over to
A the internal state of the target user and routes all of the
subsequent communications to A, who can reply arbitrarily.
For operations exclusively among corrupted users, the envi-
ronment does not expect any interaction with the simulator.
Similarly, interactions exclusively among honest nodes happen
through secure channels and therefore the attacker does not
gather any additional information other than the fact that the
interactions took place. The simulator simulates the following
honest nodes: 1) the honest τ -escrows, 2) the honest users,
3) the CA for users’ real identities. For simplicity, we omit
these operations in the description of our simulator. Next, we
describes how the simulator behaves at various points of the
protocol.
At several points in the SATE protocol, DKG is required.
namely, SKm used to compute MACs on identities, SKr used
for revealing alleger identity and SKi for each ith bucket used
for thresholding. To simulate this with a minority of statically
corrupted τ -escrows, S chooses a random key pair, performs
DKG simulation [22, Theorem 1], and sends the the public key
to the corrupted τ -escrows. As this simulation is exactly the
distribution in the real protocol [22, Theorem 1], and hence
is indistinguishable from it. Notice that the simulator knows
the DKG secret keys here. The simulator also generates the
public-private key pairs for all the honest users and generates
certificates for them from the CA.
For allegation filing and registration, we consider two cases
depending on whether or not the alleger is honest.
Case 1: Honest alleger, corrupted minority of τ -escrows
When an honest alleger registers, FSATE sends
(Register, ID) to the the simulator. The simulator proves
the honest alleger’s identity to the corrupted τ -escrows. This
is possible because it simulates the CA and can generate
arbitrary certificates. Then it generates l new public keys
pk1, . . . , pkl and secret shares them among the τ -escrows and
participates in the distributed computation of piSKm(PKi)
and FSKr (PKi) as described in §III-C (note, the simulator
knows SKm and SKr). If the adversary refuses to participate
in this computation, the simulator sends FAIL to FSATE .
Else it sends OK. As in the real protocol, the adversary obtains
FSKr (PKi), but not piSKm(PKi). So far, this is exactly
what happens in the real protocol, except that DKG and the
honest parties’ private keys are chosen by the simulator, but
from the same distribution. Hence it is indistinguishable from
the real execution.
When an honest alleger files an allegation, FSATE sends
(File, t,#) to the simulator. The simulator chooses a random
public key pk whose private component it knows, generates a
MAC on it and sends (pk, piSKm(pk), t, C) to the corrupted
escrows signed using the private part of pk, where the C is a
random non-committing encryption ciphertext. The simulator
generates a random meta-data and distributes a minority of
shares among the corrupted escrows. The distribution of meta-
data doesn’t matter since it is information theoretically hidden.
Since the adversary has not seen the honest alleger’s public key
before, the simulator can choose a random one. FSATE now
runs the bucketing protocol, and returns the resulting equality
relations. Specifically, for every new bucket this allegation
moves to, it returns which other allegations match this one. The
bucketing protocol in the real protocol goes through a similar
motion and computes PRFs on the way. Say it asks for the
PRF FSKi(m) on bucket i. FSATE would also have put this
allegation in bucket i and hence would have sent the matching
allegations to the simulator. If no matching allegations existed
in the bucket prior to this one, the simulator returns a new
random number to the adversary. Else, it returns the same
number as it returned for a preexistent matching allegation.
Since F is a PRF, the adversary cannot distinguish between
its output and truly random numbers. Note all matching
allegations have the same meta-data m by definition. Note
also that if at any point, the adversary refuses to cooperate in
distributed-input DPRF computation, the protocol is aborted,
and the simulator sends FAIL to FSATE , which also halts
execution. Else it sends OK each time to move the protocol
forward.
When the allegation of an honest alleger is to be revealed,
FSATE sends (a, ID,#) to the simulator. The simulator sends
shares of the (non-committing) symmetric encryption key from
honest τ -escrows such that the ciphertext C open to a to the
corrupted τ -escrows. To reveal identity in the real protocol, the
τ -escrows compute FSKr (pk), where pk was the public key
used during allegation. To simulate this, the simulator picks
a random unused key pki it chose when ID was registered.
It simulates the other τ -escrows’ behavior such that, if the
adversary cooperates, it gets FSKr (pki). Note, the simulator
knows SKr. Allegation reveal now succeeds.
Case 2: Corrupted alleger, corrupted minority of τ -escrows
During registration, the adversary provides a proof of ID
from a CA to the simulator. It also sends the honest τ -
escrows’ shares of l public keys pk1, . . . , pkl to the simulator.
If the proof of ID is invalid, or the shares are inappropriate,
the simulator sends FAIL to the adversary. Else, it sends
(Register, ID) to FSATE from the corrupted allegers’ ID.
Note, the simulator has a majority of shares of pki and can
hence reconstruct them. It also knows the secret key SKm.
Hence it can participate in the computation of piSKm(pki) on
the l public keys to produce the correct result.
When filing an allegation, the alleger sends
(pk, piSKm(pk), t) to the simulator for broadcasting. It
also encrypts and broadcasts the allegation text a and secret
shares the key. Finally, it secret-shares a collision-resistant
hash if the meta-data m. The simulator verifies that pk has
not been used before and verifies the MAC on it. If the check
fails, the simulator sends FAIL from the honest escrows to the
corrupted alleger. If verification succeeds, the simulator sends
(File,m, a, t) to FSATE , which responds with (File, t,#)6.
Now the bucketing algorithm takes place, the simulation
process for which is identical to the honest alleger case.
FSATE returns matching allegations for various buckets, and
we simulate for the corrupted escrows, a pseudo-random
function on the meta-data. This is possible since we know, for
the relevant buckets, meta-data of which allegations match.
6The simulator knows (m,a) since it has a majority of the necessary shares.
Again, if the shares are invalid, it sends FAIL to the adversary as verifiable
secret-sharing is used.
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When an allegation filed by a corrupted party is to be re-
vealed FSATE sends (a, ID,#) to the simulator. The simulator
sends (a, piSKr (pk)) to the corrupted escrows, where pk is the
corresponding key used to file allegation identified by #.
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